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NOTES
REPRESENTATIVE BARGAINING ORDERS: A TIME
FOR CHANGE
The establishment of a collective bargaining relationship between
an employer and its employees' representative is an important step in
fulfilling the labor policy of the United States.! One means of creating a
bargaining relationship is a "representative bargaining order."12 The
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") issues repre-
sentative bargaining orders as a remedy for employer unfair labor prac-
tices.3 The order both designates a labor organization as the collective
1 The aim of United States labor law is to foster peaceful and voluntary collective bar-
gaining. This labor relations policy is rooted in four major statutes: the Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); the Wagner Act of 1935; the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947; and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. The Taft-Hartley, Wagner, and Landrum-Grif-
fin Acts are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). These three statutes comprise the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Section 1 of the NLRA states in relevant part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negoti-
ating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
2 A bargaining order's effect differs, depending upon the prior position of the parties.
When a labor organization is certified pursuant to a secret ballot election, or is voluntarily
recognized by an employer as its employees' bargaining representative, the employer is obli-
gated to bargain with the labor organization. An employer's unexcused failure to bargain is
an unfair labor practice. In this situation, a bargaining order merely reaffirms the employer's
obligation arising from the prior certification or voluntary recognition. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976) (unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) . . ."); id.
§ 159(a) ("representative" defined as that union "designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees. ..".
When the bargaining order issues as a remedy for employer unfair labor practices com-
mitted prior to any established relationship between the parties, however, the effect is much
different. In this context, the NLRB effectively creates an obligatory bargaining relationship
where one had not previously existed. This remedy is labeled the "representative bargaining
order."
To prevent an employer from making unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining prior to the issuance of a bargaining order, the NLRB imposes a retroactive duty to
bargain dating back to the first date of the employer's unfair labor practices. See Trading
Post, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975). The Board views the presence of a union organizing
campaign, coupled with serious and pervasive unfair labor practices, as creating a bargaining
obligation on the wrongdoing employer. Id at 200-01. The Supreme Court upheld the impo-
sition of a retroactive duty to bargain in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
3 National labor policy reflects a preference that parties adjust their relations and griev-
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bargaining representative for a group of employees, and compels the
employer to bargain with that labor organization over the terms and
conditions of employment. 4
In examining representative bargaining orders, this Note first dis-
cusses some of the practical problems and policy concerns inherent in
these orders. In particular, this discussion highlights the NLRB's failure
to support adequately with detailed factual analysis its issuance of repre-
sentative bargaining orders and the resulting judicial confusion in the
circuit courts of appeals. This Note also examines the propriety of such
orders in the absence of a prior showing of majority support for the
union. Finally, in an attempt to balance policy concerns and reduce
inconsistencies in the issuance and enforcement of bargaining orders, the
Note proposes an analytical framework for imposing representative bar-
gaining orders.
I
ISSUANCE PROBLEMS AND POLICY CONCERNS
A. The Designation or Selection of a Representative
Although designation of representatives through the election pro-
cess of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act") is the
preferred method of selection,5 the Board and the courts recognize that
ances voluntarily, with minimal interference from the Board. For example, the NLRB may
not force parties to agree to collective bargaining contracts or terms. See H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (NLRB lacks statutory authority to remedy employer's repeated
refusals to bargain in good faith over a dues check-off clause by requiring employer to agree
to such a clause). Nonetheless, Congress established the concepts of "employee rights" and
"unfair labor practice" to regulate misconduct in labor-management relationships. See R.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: ORGANIZATION AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 1-6
(1976). Thus, § 8 of the Wagner Act of 1935 prohibited certain employer acts, such as re-
straint, interference, and coercion of employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights, see infra note
16; domination of unions; discrimination in terms of employment so as to discourage union
membership; and refusal to bargain in good faith with the majority representative of the
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 proscribed similar con-
duct by unions. Id § 158(b).
As a result of congressional authorization, see id § 160, the NLRB has the power to
implement a wide range of remedies for statutorily-proscribed unfair labor practices. Ex-
traordinary remedies for "aggravated and pervasive" violations of §§ 8(a)1 and 8(a)3 of the
NLRA include: personally-signed notices by the company president acknowledging viola-
tions to all employees; a reading by a high management official of a notice before a meeting of
employees; union access to nonwork areas in employer's plant during nonwork time; or an
order to the employer to furnish names and addresses of all current employees to the union.
See Hood, Bargaining Orders: The Effect of Gissel Packing Company, 32 LABOR L.J. 203 (1981).
- 4 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment ...."
5 "The most commonly traveled route for a union to obtain recognition as the exclusive
bargaining representative of an unorganized group of employees is through the Board's elec-
tion and certification procedures under § 9(c) of the Act . ..[I]t is also, from the Board's
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"designation or selection" of a representative can occur in three ways.6
First, an employer can voluntarily recognize an organization purporting
to represent a majority of employees in a designated bargaining unit.7
Second, when the employer does not voluntarily recognize a majority
union, NLRB election procedures allow employees to select, by majority
vote on a secret ballot, a labor organization as their collective bargain-
ing representative.8 Finally, in those situations in which an employer's
threatening and coercive conduct renders a free election improbable, 9
an NLRB-imposed bargaining order designates the representative.' 0
The Board issues two types of representative bargaining orders. A
non-majority bargaining order is issued when no prior showing of ma-
jority support for the labor organization has been made. In contrast, the
NLRB issues a card-majority bargaining order after proof of one-time or
continued card-majority 1 support.'2 The difference between the two
point of view, the preferred route." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969)
(footnotes omitted).
6 See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 93.
7 See NLRB v. A. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc., 541 F.2d 992, 993-95 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977).
8 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
9 Threatening and coercive techniques include: dismissal of union supporters; interro-
gation of employees; threats of plant closure; grants or denials of benefits; coercive speeches
during scheduled work time; and promulgation of overly-broad no-solicitation rules. See
NLRB v. Arrow Molded Plastics, 653 F.2d 280, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1981) (granting and with-
holding benefits and issuing overly-broad no-solicitation rule); United Dairy Farmers Coop.,
242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1028-29 (1979) (dismissals, interrogations, granting of bonuses, and
threats of plant closure).
to Once a representative bargaining order issues, a question remains as to how long that
order precludes a challenge to the union's bargaining status. Following typical NLRB certifi-
cation, no one may challenge the union's majority status, absent unusual circumstances or a
collective bargaining agreement, see infra note 28, for one year. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96
(1954). In one recent case, the General Counsel suggested that the Board give representative
bargaining orders the same effect. Irving, Remedies Under the NLRA: An Update, 32 N.Y.U.
CON. ON LAB. 73, 81 (1981). Although the parties settled the case before a Board decision
was issued, the Board's approval of the settlement containing the General Counsel's recom-
mendation may indicate Board agreement with the one-year limitation. See id
11 Unions use authorization cards for two purposes: first, to make a showing of interest
to the NLRB in support of a petition for a representation election (the NLRB requires a 30%
showing of majority support, normally through authorization cards, before commencing the
election process, 29 C.F.R. § 10 1.18(a) (1981)); second, to induce the employer to bargain by
convincing him that the union enjoys majority support.
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 604-07 (1969), stated
that unless the union solicited the cards for the sole purpose of precipitating an election,
authorization cards signed by a majority of employees could establish the requisite majority
support for a representative bargaining order. This Note is limited to cases in which the
union solicited authorization cards either for the two purposes discussed above, or for the sole
purpose of establishing majority support for the union. In addition, the Court acknowledged
in Gissel that "convincing support" shown "by a union-called strike or strike vote" may also
establish majority support. Id at 597. Because no practical difference exists between this
type of "convincing support" and card-majority support, for simplicity this Note will refer
only to card-majority support.
12 A hypothetical situation illustrates how each of these remedies operates. A labor or-
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types of bargaining orders-the prior showing of majority support-re-
flects important tensions among the principles of majority rule, em-
ployee free choice, and NLRB remedial authority.1 3 The NLRB, for
example, routinely issues, with little or no factual analysis, card-majority
bargaining orders as remedies for employer unfair labor practices. 14 On
the other hand, the NLRB, after years of rejecting their use, just recently
issued its first non-majority bargaining order. 15
B. Employee Free Choice
The principle of employee free choice is found in section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, and envisions a noncoercive atmosphere
in which an employee may fully exercise his statutory rights of self-or-
ganization, collective bargaining through chosen representatives, and
participation in concerted activities designed to fulfill labor law goals. 16
Section 7 also protects the right of employees to refrain from, as well as
ganization begins organizing employees of a manufacturing concern. In case A, the union
succeeds in persuading over 50% of the employees to sign authorization cards, indicating that
these employees support the union. In case B, the union secures cards from only 30% of the
employees, the minimum amount required to set the NLRB's election process in motion. 29
C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1981). Immediately upon hearing of union organizing, the employer be-
gins a harassment campaign designed to coerce the employees to vote against the union. See
supra note 9. As a result, in both cases the union loses the election. If the NLRB finds both
that the employer's unfair labor practices coerced the employees in selecting a representative,
and that a re-run election would be no less tainted because of the inadequacy of the NLRB's
traditional remedies to cleanse the coercive atmosphere, the Board may then order the em-
ployer in cases A and B to bargain with the labor organization. In case A, because the union
previously established a majority showing of support through authorization cards, the bar-
gaining order is a card-majority bargaining order. In case B, because there is no previous
showing of majority support through authorization cards or otherwise, a nonmajority bar-
gaining order exists.
In both cases, the employer has three choices at this point: he can bargain with the labor
representative; he can refuse to bargain and await service of process when the NLRB petitions-
a circuit court of appeals for enforcement under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); or he can directly
challenge the NLRB's findings and order in a federal court of appeals where the unfair labor
practice allegedly took place, or in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(o (1976). This hypothetical presumes an election and a union defeat. In many cases,
however, an election is never held. Prior to an election, a union may file a charge of unfair
labor practices and "block" the representation questions (i.e., the election) until after resolu-
tion of the charge. 29 C.F.R. § 102.71(b) (1981). If a bargaining order issues to remedy the
unfair labor practices, an election is no longer necessary. See NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv.,
Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 59, 69-70 (Ist Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Suburban Ford, Inc., 646 F.2d 1244,
1247 (7th Cir. 1981).
13 For a discussion of these principles, see infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
15 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). For a discussion of this
landmark decision, see infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
16 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) states in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . ..
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to participate in, any of the above activities.' 7
Many NLRB procedures and rules, especially those concerning se-
lection of collective bargaining representatives, 8 reflect a broad concern
for employee free choice."' Employee free choice necessitates that an
employee have access to all relevant information, that he be able to use
this information to determine the consequences of selecting or rejecting
union representation, and that he be able to appraise these consequences
in light of his own values.20 Consequently, employees must be guaran-
teed freedom from any obstructions in the flow of relevant information
and from influences that distort assessment of the consequences of
unionization.2 '
The NLRB issues a representative bargaining order when an em-
ployer engages in unfair labor practices that interrupt the flow of infor-
mation, distort employee perceptions, and thereby foreclose the
preferred method of secret ballot election. The inherent danger in any
17 Id The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added the right to refrain from union activity. The
Act demonstrated a shift in national labor policy, with the government becoming an "um-
pire" rather than a "paternal protector." W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 151 (1979).
18 NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(l)(A), for example, prohibit any employer or union unfair
labor practices that effectively infringe on the exercise of § 7 employee rights during an elec-
tion campaign. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). The preference for secret-ballot
elections specifically illustrates the concern for employee free choice. See supra notes 5, 8 and
accompanying text.
19 The NLRB, under its authority as the overseer of union representation elections, may
promulgate election rules: "The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act] such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]." 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1976). The NLRB, however, promulgates the majority of its rules concerning elections
and collective bargaining through individual panel decisions in selected cases. See Peck, The
Atrophied Rule-Making Powers ofthe National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE LJ. 729 (1961). The
Supreme Court questioned the Board's practice in two cases, but nonetheless recognized that
establishing rules through individual adjudication has the same effect as promulgating the
rules under the Administrative Procedure Act's rule-making provisions. See NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
762-66 (1969).
Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966) provides an example of Board rule-
promulgation through adjudication. The Excelsior rule obligates employers, upon demand
from unions, to furnish a list of the names and addresses of all employees eligible to vote in
representation elections. Id One purpose of the rule is to ensure that each employee has
access to all information relevant to the question of union representation. See Wyman-Cordon
Co., 394 U.S. at 767. The Board first announced the Excelsior rule, however, in an unfair
labor practice adjudication. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
Although violation of election rules does not necessarily constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice, disobedience is sufficient to set aside an election. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 45. The
major purpose of all Board election rules is to ensure "laboratory conditions" preceding repre-
sentation elections that will best effectuate employee free choice in an uncoerced atmosphere.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948), enforced, 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951).
20 See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 46 (1964); supra note 19.
21 Bok, supra note 20, at 47.
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representative bargaining order remedy, however, is that the collective
bargaining relationship resulting from the order will not accurately re-
flect the employees' free choice. Although employer unfair labor prac-
tices may prevent uncoerced exercise of employee choice, the issuance of
a bargaining order similarly represses an employee's individual ap-
praisal of the consequences of unionization. Unless the NLRB can show
that but for the unfair labor practices the employees would have voted
for unionization, a bargaining order risks strapping employees with un-
wanted union representation. 22 The NLRB thus must make the troub-
lesome and difficult determination of whether a bargaining order will
effectuate the result that would occur if employee free choice existed, or
whether the order to protect freedom of choice will impose union repre-
sentation when a fair and free election might lead to an opposite
result.23
C. Majority Rule
Although employee free choice influences the method of representa-
tive selection, majority rule determines whether the labor organization
will represent all or none of the employees. This principle reflects the
democratic basis of labor relations in the United States and is found in
several parts of the NLRA, including section 8 (unfair labor practices) 2 4
and section 9 (designation and selection of representatives),25 Simply
stated, the rule is: when a majority of employees desire union represen-
tation, the labor organization selected becomes the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees;2 6 when the majority of employees rejects
22 Absolute causation, of course, is impossible to prove. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF LAW OF TORTS 242 (1971).
23 As the Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15
(1969):
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices
and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional reme-
dies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed
through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order,
then such an order should issue ...
24 Under §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2), for example, it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a union representing only a minority of employees. See
ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (employer may not enter into "memorandum of
agreement" with union representing only a minority of employees). In exchange for the right
of exclusive representation, however, a majority union has a duty to fairly represent the mi-
nority group of employees. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
25 See infra note 26. The NLRB, for example, employs decertification procedures
whereby employees may petition for an election to decertify the labor organization as the
majority representative. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.17-101.21 (1981).
26 "[R]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); see J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (contracts with individual employees may not in-
fringe upon collective bargaining agreement with union).
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unionization, the labor organization does not represent any of the
employees. 27
Although the principle of majority rule is sometimes compromised
to fulfill other policies of the Act,2 8 the general rule remains. Accord-
ingly, in the area of bargaining orders the question is to what extent
such orders may infringe on majority rule. Issuing a bargaining order
without clear evidence of majority support undermines the principle of
majority rule. On the other hand, a finding by the Board that, but for
the unfair labor practices, the union would have had majority support,
militates in favor of issuing a bargaining order. Therefore, in consider-
ing whether to issue a representative bargaining order, the NLRB
should be convinced that the employer's unfair labor practices had a
causal effect on the union's loss of or failure to gain majority support. 29
D. Employer Deterrence
Although the need for employer deterrence underlies any NLRB
remedy, a remedy must only deter future employer misconduct, and
should not penalize employer behavior because of previous acts.30
When bargaining orders issue, the question is the degree to which the
principle of employer deterrence may compromise employee free choice
27 See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 375.
28 In order to instill stability into bargaining relationships and impress upon employees
the seriousness of the representation question, the NLRB has created two limits on challenges
to a union's majority status: the certification bar and the contract bar. The certification bar
creates an irrebuttable presumption of continued majority status for a union during its first
year of certification. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). After the first year, however, rival
unions or individual employees may challenge a certified union's status through the decertifi-
cation procedures. Id at 103.
Under the contract bar, a valid, written collective bargaining agreement of definite dura-
tion prevents an outside union from seeking an election for the length of the contract (up to a
maximum of three years). General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). Congress
has created an additional limitation on elections: "No election shall be directed in any bar-
gaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
29 The Supreme Court recognized the causation issue in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969) (emphasis added).
Remaining before us is the propriety of a bargaining order as a remedy
for a § 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain where an employer has committed independ-
ent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election un-
likely or which have infact undermined a union's majority and caused an election to
be set aside.
30 Section 10(c) authorizes the Board to devise "an order requiring [the wrongdoer] to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action. . . as
will effectuatethe policies of [the Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The NLRB, however,
recognizes three general limitations on its power under section 10(c): a remedy cannot be so
broad as to punish a particular respondent or class of respondents; a remedy cannot defeat
other purposes of the Act by causing irreparable harm or hampering meaningful collective
bargaining; and a Board order cannot compel either party to agree to mandatory subjects of
bargaining. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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and majority rule. If deterring employer conduct was the sole concern,
a bargaining order would issue in every case; bargaining orders impose
representation without a secret ballot election and thereby negate the
employer's motive for misconduct. Deterrence is not the sole concern,
however, and the NLRB instead must balance the effectiveness of bar-
gaining orders in deterring employer conduct against the infringement
on employee free choice and majority rule. With these principles in
mind, it is appropriate to examine the history, use, and problems of rep-
resentative bargaining orders.
II
REPRESENTATIVE BARGAINING ORDERS AND
JUDICIAL CONFUSION
A. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.31
Gissel is the landmark case on the propriety of representative bar-
gaining orders. On consolidated review of four cases, the Supreme
Court held that the NLRB may properly issue a bargaining order when
an employer has committed unfair labor practices that make a fair elec-
tion unlikely, and the union has shown prior majority support through
authorization cards.32 The Court found that a bargaining order's pur-
pose is two-fold: "a bargaining order is designed as much to remedy
past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct. '33
The Court in Gissel suggested a new tripartite classification system
for determining the propriety of a bargaining order.34 First, "excep-
tional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor
practices may warrant a bargaining order even if the union cannot
31 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
32 Id at 610-16.
33 Id at 612 (footnote omitted).
34 Id at 613-15. The NLRB's traditional approach was theJoy Silk doctrine. See Joy
Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951). Under that rule, even though a union claimed representative status
through possession of authorization cards, an employer lawfully could refuse to bargain if it
had a "good faith doubt" as to the union's majority status. The Board could enter a bargain-
ing order only if it found the absence of a good faith doubt; the employer's independent
unfair labor practices or the employer's failure to justify its doubt supported such a finding.
Gissel, 395 U.S. at 592-93.
The Board modified theJoy Silk doctrine in Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966),
when it shifted the burden to the General Counsel to show bad faith, and indicated that not
every unfair labor practice would automatically result in a finding of bad faith. The Board
added that the employer need no longer come forward with a justification for his good faith
doubt. 158 N.L.R.B. at 1078-79. The Board abandoned theJoy Silk-Aaron Bros. doctrine in
the oral argument for Gissel, and instead argued that an employer's good faith doubt was
irrelevant. 395 U.S. at 594. After Gissel, therefore, the focus in the issuance of a bargaining
order is on the commission of serious unfair labor practices that tend to preclude fair elec-
tions, rather than on the employer's good faith. Id
1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
demonstrate that a majority of the unit's employees once supported it.35
Second, a bargaining order is appropriate in "less extraordinary cases
marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the ten-
dency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process,"
but only if the union once had majority support.36 Finally, a bargaining
order is never appropriate in cases marked by "minor or less extensive
unfair labor practices" that have a "minimal impact on the election
machinery. 3 7
Gissel dealt exclusively with the second category of card-majority
bargaining orders.38 The Court failed to articulate specific standards for
their issuance, but did mention four factors that the NLRB should con-
sider in fashioning a bargaining-order remedy: the extensiveness of an
employer's unfair labor practices; the likelihood of their recurrence; the
effectiveness of traditional remedies in erasing the effects of past prac-
tices and ensuring a fair election; and the possibility that a bargaining
order would better protect employee sentiment.3 9
B. Post-Gissel Problems
Gissel provided the NLRB with broad discretion to develop bar-
gaining-order remedies.40 Nevertheless, the Board has failed in its use of
both card-majority and nonmajority bargaining orders to create an ef-
fective and consistent remedy for the commission of serious unfair labor
practices. The central flaw is the NLRB's consistent refusal to support
issuance of card-majority bargaining orders with a detailed application
of facts to standards and its tendency to pay only lip service to the fac-
35 395 U.S. at 613-14. This category is hereinafter referred to as the "nonmajority bar-
gaining order."
36 Id at 614. This category is hereinafter called the "card-majority bargaining order."
37 Id at 615. Although category three is outside the discussion of this Note, two exam-
ples within this category help explain the variability in seriousness of unfair labor practices.
In NLRB v. Gruber's Super Market, Inc., 501 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1974), the court refused to
enforce a bargaining order when the evidence showed only a single unfair labor practice-a
unilateral wage increase--and no evidence of anti-union animus. In Poughkeepsie Newspa-
pers, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 972 (1969), the Board refused to issue a bargaining order when
promises and threats were directed at a few employees: "[T]hese few violations, occurring in
a unit of 52 employees, in our opinion, are not of sufficient gravity to support an 8(a)(5)
finding or bargaining order." Id at 973 (footnote omitted).
38 "The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's use of the bargaining
order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still
have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process." 395
U.S. at 614.
39 Id at 614-15.
40 It is for the Board and not the courts, however, to make that determination
[whether to issue a bargaining order], based on its expert estimate as to the
effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity. In
fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of § 10(c) of the Act,. ..
the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its
choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.
Id at 612 n.32 (citation omitted).
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tors that the Gissel Court outlined.41 Instead, the Board has chosen to
render presumptuous findings.42 Furthermore, although the propriety
of card-majority bargaining orders is clear after Gissel, the status of
nonmajority bargaining orders remains uncertain.43
1. Card-Majority Bargaining Orders
By regulation, an NLRB decision must contain "detailed findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and basic reasons for decision on all material
issues raised. . "..,44 In addition, two principles require that the NLRB
provide a reasoned analysis that sets forth those factors justifying issu-
ance of a bargaining order. First, bargaining orders subordinate the
right of employees to choose freely their representative to the purpose of
remedying employer's unfair labor practices. 45 To ensure the preferred
41 See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 98:
In most of the cases decided by the Board prior to Gissel and subse-
quently remanded, as well as cases decided after Gissel, the Board has con-
tented itself with a recounting of the employer violations and a rather sketchy
or conclusory finding on the question whether they were severe enough so as
likely to preclude a fair election.
See also Hood, supra note 3, at 210 ("By failing to articulate the factors which justify the
issuance of a bargaining order in a substantial number of cases, the Board has created uncer-
tainty about its judgment in Gissel-type cases."). Other commentators criticize the NLRB for
failing to analyze adequately the necessity for card-majority bargaining orders in individual
cases. See Sharpe, A Reappraisal of the Bargaining Order: Towarda Consistent Application of NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 556 (1974); Walther & Douglas, NLRB Bargaining
Orders: A Problem-Solving or Ivogy Tower Approach to Labor Law, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1977)
(Mr. Walther was a member of the NLRB from Nov. 1975 to Aug. 1977); Wortman &Jones,
RemedialActions of the NLRB in Representation Cases: An Analysis of the Gissel Bargaining Order, 30
LAB. L.J. 281 (1970); Note, The Gissel Bargaining Order, the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals:
Should the Supreme Court Take a Second Look?, 32 S.C.L. REv. 399 (1980).
Recent Board decisions provide a continued basis for this criticism. See e.g., Roth's IGA
Foodliner, 259 N.L.R.B. 132 (1981) (one-paragraph summary supporting bargaining order);
Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 252 (1981) (recital of unfair labor
practices and conclusion that bargaining order appropriate). Other recent decisions, how-
ever, may show an increased awareness of the necessity of factual analysis. See e.g., Viracon,
Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1981) (application of four Gissel factors to employer's unfair labor
practices); C.E. Wilkinson & Sons, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1367 (1981) (same).
42 For a typical example, see Dadco Fashions, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1979), enforced,
632 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980). The Board stated:
As the Supreme Court made clear in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,
, unfair labor practices of the number and severity of those herein have a
negative impact on the free choice of employees. We therefore conclude, in
agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that a bargaining order is
appropriate under the circumstances in the instant proceeding.
243 N.L.R.B. at 1194; see also Ely's Foods Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 909 (1980), enforced, 656 F.2d 290
(8th Cir. 1981); Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 867 (1978), enforced in part, 608 F.2d
988 (4th Cir. 1979); Essex Wire Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 397 (1971), remanded mem., 496 F.2d 862
(6th Cir. 1972); West Side Plymouth, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 437 (1969).
43 See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
44 29 C.F.R. § 101.12 (1981).
45 See Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 991 (3d
Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
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status of the secret ballot election,4 6 a bargaining order should not issue
as the norm, but only when it is a necessary exception.
Second, section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act empow-
ers the federal courts of appeals to enforce those NLRB orders that are
supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole."'4 7 The Supreme Court defines the NLRB "as one of those agen-
cies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a
specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the
authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore
must respect."'48 On review of a Board order, an appellate court may
not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo."'49 Nevertheless, when faced with
a petition for enforcement of a bargaining order unsupported by de-
tailed factual analysis, courts choose one of three options.
Some courts of appeals, unwilling to play a strong supervisory role
in the labor relations area, enforce card-majority orders with little ap-
parent concern for the lack of factual analysis.50 Other courts, unwilling
In imposing bargaining orders, the Board is subordinating the em-
ployee's right to express his choice to its forecast as to who would have won
the election if the employer had maintained laboratory conditions. When
that prediction is little more than a guess, however, the Board's paternalism
does not justify depriving the employees of their vote.
46 See supra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text.
47 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951) (discussion of the scope of review contemplated under § 10(e)).
48 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
49 Id
50 See e.g., NLRB v. Ely's Foods, Inc., 656 F.2d 290, 293 (8th Cir. 1981):
While we agree that the specific factual findings of the Board and the ALJ
with regard to the necessity of a bargaining order were perhaps less than de-
sirable for appellate review and present only a marginal case for bypassing the
preferred election procedure, we find that the complete findings of the Board
.. .and the record as a whole support issuance of a bargaining order in this
case.
In Tipton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1980), the majority stated: "[I]t is
for the Board and not the courts to make a determination based on its expert estimate as to
the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity." 621 F.2d at
898; accord Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1978); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v.
NLRB, 438 F.2d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1971). Contra Tipton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890,
899 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (Board's determination should not be supported
because "Board has fallen into the trap of using an easy, mechanical application of general
rules in a manner that impairs the free choice of the employees."); NLRB v. Arrow Molded
Plastics, 653 F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 1981) ("It is equally inappropriate to enforce bargaining
orders where the Board's rationale for the order was conclusory."); NLRB v. Jamaica Tow-
ing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1980) (bargaining order unenforceable when Board
failed to consider employee turnover as a factor and to explain its standards in calling for the
order); Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1979) (order unenforceable
when record lacked substantial evidence that unfair labor practices were serious enough to
tend to undermine majority strength and impede the election process).
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to enforce an unsupported order, but acknowledging that denial of the
order would only reward the employer's misconduct, simply remand to
the NLRB for further factual analysis.5 1 Still other courts are aware
that the inherent delay of a remand weakens the remedial and deterrent
effect of a bargaining order.5 2 These courts choose to supply their own
factual analysis in determining the propriety of enforcing a bargaining
order.5 3 Such analysis goes beyond review for "substantial evidence of
the record considered as a whole,"5 4 and considers the nature of the un-
fair labor practices, the surrounding circumstances, and the possibility
of holding a fair election.5 5 The result is de novo review and a transfer of
the factfinder's role from the NLRB to the courts-a situation not con-
51 See e.g., NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2211, 2217 (3d Cir.
1981) ("We do not rule out the possibility that a collective bargaining order could be appro-
priate in this case. We ask only for the specific findings upon which to conduct our review.");
Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977).
52 See e.g., Red Oaks Nursing Home v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1980) ("It is
unfortunate that this fundamental question of employee representation rights should receive
so little attention from the Board and should be the subject of the long delays of remand
necessitated by the Board's failure to act in the first instance."); Peerless of Am., Inc. v.
NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1120 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Consequently, in our desire to avoid needless
and futile delay, we shall make the essential analysis and deny enforcement.).
The Hedstrom cases graphically illustrate the problem of delay. See Hedstrom Co. v.
NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 96 (1981) (Hedstrom II);
Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hedtrom 1). The representation elec-
tion was held in March 1974. In July 1977, the Third Circuit remanded the Board's initial
imposition of a bargaining order because of a lack of factual analysis. The-Board subse-
quently engaged in a factual analysis, but it was not until August 1980, six years after the
election, that the Third Circuit enforced the bargaining order.
53 See NLRB v. Dadco Fashions, Inc., 632 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1980) (court considers
nature of the unfair labor practices, their severity, and size and population of town in which
factory was located); Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1120 (7th Cir. 1973) ("We
conclude on analysis of the simple facts involved that we would be abdicating our judicial
function and shirking our responsibilities if we ever enforced a bargaining order in this
case.'); see also Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1129-30 (5th Cir. 1980);
Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 1975). One court went a step
further and created a presumption against the propriety of a bargaining order when the
NLRB inadequately justifies the order's necessity:
Because the Board acknowledges the importance of [section 71 rights, how-
ever, we decline to view the Board's inaction as the result of a flagrant disre-
gard for their duties under the law. Rather, except in extreme cases where the
reasons for the Board's decision, although not expressly stated, are obvious
..., we think it appropriate to presume from the legal principle that elec-
tions are the preferred means for determining representative status and from
the absence of express articulated consideration, that the necessary require-
ments for a bargaining order prescribed in Girsel are not present.
Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1980).
54 See 29 U.S.C. 160(e) (1976); supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1120-22 (7th Cir. 1973) (court
considers degree of fear generated by the unfair labor practices, continued strength of the
union campaign, apologetic statements of management to the employees, likelihood of future
misconduct, and substantial reduction in the workforce).
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templated in Congress's labor relations scheme.56
The Board's failure to engage in factual analysis of the propriety of
issuing card-majority bargaining orders creates other problems as well.
The lack of detailed factual analysis results in inconsistencies in the
Board's decision whether or not to issue card-majority bargaining or-
ders. In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.,57 (General Stencils I) the Second
Circuit faulted the NLRB for failing to support its issuance of a bargain-
ing order with specific factual findings.58 To support its criticism, the
court highlighted three earlier cases in which the NLRB had declined to
issue bargaining orders.59 The court found the severity of unfair labor
practices in those cases indistinguishable from those of the employer in
General Stencils 160 Concluding that "[b]argaining orders are not im-
56 A remand for a statement of the Board's reasons has in the past proved futile
• .., and, typically, this court has reached the merits of the propriety of the
order, in part to avoid further compromise of employee rights inherent in the
delay of remand. . . . Thus, the effect of the Board's continuing neglect to
fashion standards for the exercise of its discretion is to place exclusive reliance
on judicially-prescribed standards for determining the need for bargaining
orders, a practice not contemplated by section 10(c) of the Act.
Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1980).
57 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
58 Id at 901-02. The General Stencils cases serve as good examples of the Board's persis-
tent unwillingness to supply factual analysis to justify bargaining orders. In 1967, the union
filed unfair labor practices against the employer.- In 1969, the NLRB issued a bargaining
order. In 1971, the Second Circuit remanded the bargaining-order issue to the Board for
further analysis, even suggesting possible frameworks under which the Board could act. Id at
901-05. In 1972, the NLRB, q.ith one member in dissent, adhered to its original opinion.
The Second Circuit again refused to enforce the order, criticizing the Board for its continued
inadequate analysis and for "blowing up bits and pieces to arrive at a conclusion not justified
by a fair reading of the record as a whole." NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472 F.2d 170, 175
(2d Cir. 1972).
59 438 F.2d at 903-04. The three cases were Blade-Tribune Publishing Co., 180
N.L.R.B. 432 (1969) (interrogation of 13 out of 23 employees; imposition of harsher working
conditions on union activist); Stoutco, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 78 (1969) (employer threats of plant
closure, loss of benefits, or harder working conditions; "suggestion" that a union activist
should quit; prediction that the union activist would be terminated after the election); Schre-
menti Bros., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 853 (1969) (threats to and physical assaults of nonemployee
union organizers; surveillance of employees).
60 438 F.2d at 903-04. The General Stencils cases involved interrogation of three employ-
ees and threats of plant closure and loss of benefits. On remand, the NLRB attempted to
explain the apparent inconsistencies in its holdings but, as the Second Circuit stated, "[t]he
[Board] majority appeared to think it sufficient to say that the cases were different, as all cases
are, whereas the real question is whether they were significantly different, and, if so, how."
472 F.2d at 174.
The Seventh Circuit has similarly criticized the NLRB for failing to clearly indicate why
it issued bargaining orders in some cases but not in others. In Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB,
484 F.2d 1108, 1119 n.18 (7th Cir. 1973), the court stated:
In a footnote in its decision the Board did attempt to distinguish this case
from one other case, Motown Record Corp., 197 NLRB No. 176, wherein no
bargaining order was issued. But simply dramatically characterizing (or mis-
characterizing) the misconduct here as "flagrant, extensive, and far-reaching;
[having] covered a much longer period of time; and [having] included direct
threats of discharge and plant closing, as well as promises of benefits" and
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mune from the great principle that like cases must receive like treat-
ment," 61 the court remanded the bargaining order issue to the Board for
further proceedings.62
Others claim that the Board's inconsistent handling of card-major-
ity bargaining orders results in increased unfair labor practices. 63 The
NLRB's failure to articulate clearly its standards has left employers with
little guidance and less incentive to act in a lawful manner during union
election campaigns. 4
2. Non-Majority Bargaining Orders65
Problems also pervade the area of nonmajority bargaining orders.
Conflicts among majority rule, employee free choice, and NLRB reme-
dial policy sharpen where the Board creates a bargaining relationship
with no prior showing of majority employee support by the union. The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gisse/ Packing Co. 66 spoke of the possible us
of nonmajority bargaining orders only when "outrageous and perv-
sive" unfair labor practices existed. 67 If the NLRB's failure to an4ze
factual underpinnings of card-majority bargaining orders carries over
into nonmajority bargaining order cases, problems will arise in limiting
nonmajority bargaining orders to the use envisioned in Gissel 68
Prior to 1981, the problem of applying the Gissel standard to
appraising the misconduct in the other case as "neither extensive nor of such a
nature as to have a lingering effect that could not be erased by the Board's
traditional remedies" is hardly a very persuasive differentiation.
See also NLRB v. Scoler's Inc., 466 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1972) (Moore, C.J., concur-
ring) (finding the misconduct in three cases in which the Board did not issue a bargaining
order indistinguishable from the misconduct in the case before the court).
61 438 F.2d at 904-05.
62 Id at 905. For subsequent history of the case, see supra note 58.
63 Hood, supra note 3, at 204 ("Since 1969, the number of unfair labor practice cases
filed with the National Labor Relations Board has increased annually. The ineffectiveness of
remedies available to the Board to deal with unfair labor practices may have encouraged
campaign misconduct."). Although the specific effect of inadequately analyzed bargaining
orders on this increase is unknown, a more consistent approach in the issuance and nforce-
ment of bargaining orders would minimize any such effect. Awareness that certainmiscon-
duct automatically triggers a bargaining order would deter employers from committing such
conduct.
64 One commentator suggests that the lack of factual analysis in the area of bargaining
orders has led to a decrease in the severity of unfair labor practices necessary to trigger the
issuance of a bargaining order. Id at 207 ("Although identical factual circumstances are not
presented in any particular case, similar employer conduct which would not, in the Board's
opinions, have warranted a bargaining order in the early 1970s now may merit such an or-
der."). Such a change, however, may have resulted from the NLRB's recognition that tradi-
tional remedies fail to deter employer conduct, thus leaving the bargaining order as the only
practicable alternative.
65 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
67 Id at 613-14.
68 See Note, NLRB Bargaining Orders in the Absence of a Union Majoriy: Time to Enforce
Gissel, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 291, 317-22 (1981) (discussion of NLRB's inconsistent delinea-
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nonmajority bargaining orders never arose because the NLRB consist-
ently refused to issue bargaining orders without a prior showing of ma-
jority support.69 Indeed, before 1980 no court had held that the NLRB
had authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders. 70 The three deci-
sions involving United Daiy Farmers Cooperative Association, however, led
to a drastic change in NLRB remedial policy and in court perception of
NLRB remedial authority.7 1 The question remains, however, whether
these changes are justified.
The first United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association 72 decision (United
Daiy I) contains the most detailed statement of the NLRB's previous
position on nonmajority bargaining orders. The NLRB General Coun-
sel charged United Dairy Farmers Cooperative with a series of serious
unfair labor practices, including threats of plant closure, discriminatory
tion between Girsel category one and category two unfair labor practices); supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
69 See F.W.I.L. Lundy Bros. Restaurants, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 415, 415-16, 435-36 (1980);
Triana Indus., 245 N.L.R.B. 1258, 1259, 1266 (1979); Wonsocket Health Center, 245
N.L.R.B. 668, 670 (1979); Miami Springs Properties, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 668, 670 (1979);
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1026-27 (1979); Haddon House Food
Prods., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1058 (1979); Capital Foods, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 855, 856 n.5
(1979); Seligman & Assoc., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 110, 123-24 (1979); Herbert Halperin Distrib.
Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 239, 246 (1977); South Station Liquor Store, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1115,
1123-24 (1976); Grismac Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 1108, 1108 (1973); Fugua Homes Mo., Inc., 201
N.L.R.B. 130, 130-31 (1973); GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 902, 903 (1972);
Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557, 557-58 (1970); Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795, 1806-07
(1966); J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 877 (1966); H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155
N.L.R.B. 714, 716 (1965).
70 A few courts had supported in dicta the concept of nonmajority bargaining orders.
See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Armcor Indus., 535 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1976); J.P. Stevens & Co., Gulistan Div. v. NLRB,
441 F.2d 514, 519 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing
Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1967). But see NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597
F.2d 1046, 1051 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to consider propriety of bargaining order be-
cause union lacked card majority).
71 In 1979, the NLRB issued the first remedial order in the United Daig Farmers Coop.
trilogy. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979). Although not a repre-
sentative bargaining order, the Board's action required the employer to: mail a Board notice
to employees and include it in company publications; publish the notice in newspapers; have
its president sign all notices and read them to employees assembled for that purpose; grant
the union reasonable access to bulletin boards when notices were customarily posted; grant
the union access to employer facilities in nonwork areas during nonwork time; and grant the
union the right to deliver a 30-minute pre-election speech during worktime, as well as notice
of, and equal time and facilities to respond to, any address by the employer to its employees
concerning union representation.
In the next year, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced the Board's order,
but remanded for consideration of the propriety of issuing a nonmajority bargaining order on
the facts of the case. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir.
1980). The court rejected the argument that the Board had no authority to issue nonmajority
bargaining orders. 633 F.2d at 1066. On remand, a three-member panel of the Board issued
a nonmajority bargaining order. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772
(1981).
72 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979).
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firing of union adherents, loss of benefits, and interrogation of employ-
ees. 73 After upholding the Administrative Law Judge's unfair labor
practice findings, the NLRB considered the propriety of issuing a
nonmajority bargaining order.7 4 All five NLRB members heard the
case and wrote three opinions, each of which took a different view of the
NLRB's authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders.7 5 Because
three members voted against issuance of a bargaining order, the General
Counsel appealed to the Third Circuit (UnitedDairg I1). 76 Holding that
the NLRB did have the authority to issue nonmajority bargaining or-
ders, the court remanded. 77 On remand in United Dai'y 11178 a three-
member panel of the Board, composed of the two dissenting members in
United Daig I and a newly-appointed member, 79 found a nonmajority
bargaining order appropriate in light of the "outrageous and pervasive"
unfair labor practices. 80
73 Id at 1046-55.
74 Id at 1026.
75 Members Murphy and Truesdale wrote the Board's opinion, and stated that although
the Board may have the authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders,
on the facts in this case we are persuaded that, in the absence of a prior show-
ing by the Union of majority support at some point in the proceeding, it is less
destructive of the Act's purposes to provide a secret-ballot election whereby
the employees are enabled to exercise their choice for or against union repre-
sentation than it is to risk negating that choice altogether by imposing a bar-
gaining representative upon employees without some history of majority
support for the Union.
Id at 1028. Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins concurred in the finding of unfair labor
practices, but disagreed with the refusal to issue a nonmajority bargaining order. They be-
lieved that a bargaining order was "the only adequate remedy for this [employer's] flagrant
and pervasive violations of the Act." Id at 1031.
Member Penello concurred in both the denial of the bargaining order and the finding of
unfair labor practices, but dissented as to the plurality's discussion of the Board's possible
authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders:
Holdings of the Supreme Court, the plain words of the statute, and its
legislative history confirm the correctness of the Board's prior practice [of not
issuing nonmajority bargaining orders] and establish that the Board's reme-
dial authority is limited by the majority rule doctrine. I must therefore dis-
sent from my colleagues' determination that in future cases bargaining orders
shall issue in derogation of the majority rule precept.
Id at 1038. Thus, a majority of the Board, Members Murphy, Truesdale, and Penello voted
against issuance of a bargaining order.
76 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
77 Thus, we hold that the Board has the remedial authority to issue a bargaining
order in the absence of a card majority and election victory if the employer
has committed such "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices that
there is no reasonable possibility that a free and uncoerced election could be
held. . . . [W]e must remand for the Board to consider in the first instance
whether the facts in this case rise to the "outrageous" and "pervasive" con-
duct which sanctions the issuance of such bargaining orders.
Id. at 1069.
78 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981).
79 Member Zimmerman commenced his term on the Board on December 16, 1980.
80 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 774 (1981). The Board's anal-
ysis was an improvement in its attention to factual findings, discussing in detail why the case
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:950
The decision in United Dai- III does not settle the issue of
nonmajority bargaining orders. Although the Third Circuit upheld the
propriety of such orders,81 the District of Columbia Circuit recently ex-
pressed doubts as to their validity.82 In addition, two new members of
the NLRB, including the present chairman, recently voiced their objec-
tions to the use of nonmajority bargaining orders.83 An analysis of the
involved "outrageous and pervasive" unfair labor practices in contrast to "less extraordinary"
cases in which prior majority support would be necessary. The Board's analysis of ensuring a
fair election through traditional remedies, however, is sketchy. Although the Board's decision
in United Dai
, 
is an improvement in factual analysis, one wonders if the Board would have
engaged in such an examination if the case had not been the first decision in which it issued a
nonmajority bargaining order.
81 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
82 Local 115, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir.
1981),enforcing asmod fledsub nom Haddon House Food Prods., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979),cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 837 (1981). Haddon House was decided the same day as UnitedDaiyi All five
Board members heard the case and again issued three opinions on the propriety of
nonmajority bargaining orders. 242 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1060, 1063 (1979).
The D.C. Circuit, in reviewing Haddon House, found it unnecessary to consider the propri-
ety of nonmajority bargaining orders in light of the procedural posture of the case. The court
did, however, criticize the Third Circuit's findings in United Daig, II, stating: "We do not
share [the Third Circuit's] confidence that the Board's authority is so broad ... " 640 F.2d
at 397 n.7.
The Fifth Circuit also apparently rejects the propriety of nonmajority bargaining orders.
In NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979), the union had solicited
authorization cards by telling each employee that all other employees had already signed
cards. The court found that this misrepresentation invalidated the card's use as a reliable
indicator of majority support. 597 F.2d at 1051. The Board, however, relying on the card
majority, had already issued a card-majority bargaining order to remedy the employer's un-
fair labor practices, which included coercive interrogations, restrictions on solicitations, and
discharge of a leading union adherent. Reserving the issue of the seriousness of the employer's
unfair labor practices, the court held that the bargaining order was inappropriate because the
union misrepresentation meant that "the union [lacked] the valid card majority necessary for
a Gissel order." 597 F.2d at 1051 & n.8. Thus, the court read Gissel as requiring a valid card
majority before a bargaining order could issue, implicitly rejecting the propriety of
nonmajority bargaining orders.
83 Member Jenkins and Member Fanning (ex-Chairman) are still on the Board. The
new members are Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter. In a recent case with facts
similar to United Daig, Members Jenkins, Fanning, and Zimmerman comprised a majority
and, following UnitedDaiy III, imposed a nonmajority bargaining order. See Conair Corp.,
261 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1173 (1982). Chairman Van de Water and
Member Hunter, however, vigorously dissented, citing their disagreement with the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in United Daig II, and reiterating ex-Member Pennelo's arguments in dissent in
United DaiZ I The key vote in this battle is Member Zimmerman who, in United Dai
, 
III,
refused to discuss his views on Board authority to issue nonmajority bargaining orders, and
instead "respectfully recognize[d] the Third Circuit's decision as binding on the Board for the
purpose of deciding [United Dairy III]." 257 N.L.R.B. 772 n.8 (1981).
Because the unfair labor practices supporting the bargaining order occurred in New
Jersey, the Conair case, if appealed by the employer, could very likely end up in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976). Member Zimmerman's vote, with
Members Fanning and Jenkins in Conair, therefore, may simply represent his continued defer-
ence to the Third Circuit's opinion in UnitedDaigy III On the other hand, Conair Corp. may
also appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976). In
that case Conair would enjoy a greater prospect of success, given that court's hesitancy to
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arguments, both in favor of nonmajority bargaining orders and against
them, clarifies the nature of this dispute.
a. Arguments for Nonmajority Bargaining Orders. Three major consid-
erations support issuance of nonmajority bargaining orders. First, the
Supreme Court in Gissel arguably recognized the propriety of
nonmajority bargaining orders in exceptional circumstances. 84
Proponents believe that the Court's discussion of such orders was
more than "an intellectual excursion"; rather it was "a sign post giving
directions which lower courts should follow in the future. '85 These pro-
ponents contend that the Supreme Court in Gissel recognized that cases
involving "'outrageous and pervasive' unfair labor practices"8 6 necessi-
tate nonmajority bargaining orders to effectuate the purposes of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
Second, courts have recognized that the NLRB may balance the
principles of majority rule and employee free choice against its own re-
medial policies.87 For example, in other areas of labor law, the Board
has subordinated majority yule and free choice if protection of other
labor policies necessitate a different result;88 consequently, proponents
argue, nonmajority bargaining orders are not invalid because they com-
promise other policies.89 Moreover, the NLRB can minimize an order's
support the concept of a nonmajority bargaining order. See Local 115, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837 (1981).
84 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969); United Dairy Farmers
Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980) (United Daiqy II); Comment,
UnitedDaily Farmers Coop: NLRB Bargaining Orders in the Absence ofa Clear Showing ofa Pro-Union
Majority, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 840, 842 (1980); Note, NLRB Bargaining Orders in the Absence of a
Union Majority: Time to Enforce Gissel, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 291, 306-07 (1981); 47 TENN. L.
REv. 418, 423 (1980).
85 United Daig II, 633 F.2d 1054, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980).
86 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969). But see supra note 58.
87 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1035 nn.42-43 (1979)
(Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting), for cases in which the Supreme Court has supported Board
balance of remedial policies and majority rule.
88 See, e.g., NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940) (approving order disestablishing
employer-dominated union and forbidding it from appearing on ballot in later representation
election); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (approving
order requiring employer to cease recognizing union that the employer unlawfully dominated
and assisted even though no evidence existed that the union did not enjoy majority support.).
89 Furthermore, proponents contend that although nonmajority bargaining orders can
create new relationships when none previously existed, Board remedies can do more than
merely maintain the status quo. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Work-
ers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970) (D.C. Circuit accepts
concept of "made-whole relief," when employer flagrantly refuses to bargain in good faith,
this remedy envisions a determination of what the parties would have agreed to if bargaining
took place, and implementation of those predicted wages and benefits); see also R. GORMAN,
supra note 3, at 536-39. But see Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB,
374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1967). In Local 57, the D.C. Circuit re-
fused to sustain an NLRB order that would have forced an employer, who had committed
unfair labor practices by transferring operations from New York to Florida, to bargain collec-
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adverse effect on majority rule and employee free choice. Nonmajority
bargaining orders need not be permanent. 90 Indeed, the NLRB tradi-
tionally issues card-majority bargaining orders for only one year or a
'treasonable period."9' Other safeguards are also available to balance
effectively majority rule, employee free choice, and employer deter-
rence.
92
Finally, the exclusion of nonmajority bargaining orders from the
NLRB's remedial scheme would arguably encourage employers to act
swiftly in squashing any initial indications of union support.93 Deter-
rence of employers is the most persuasive argument for nonmajority bar-
gaining orders. Frequently, no other alternative is available for use
against recidivist employers with long histories of violating traditional
and extraordinary Board remedies.94 Additionally, if employer unfair
labor practices make a free election improbable, proponents argue that
the NLRB should resolve doubts of the employees' real choice against
the employer and thereby prevent "him from capitalizing on the uncer-
tainty created by his own unlawful acts."'95 Therefore, regardless of
whether Gissel supports the issuance of nonmajority bargaining orders,
practical considerations mandate that a more effective remedy, such as
the nonmajority bargaining order, be available when all other tradi-
tional and extraordinary remedies have failed.
tively with employees at the Florida facility. The court remanded to the Board on the ground
that the Board had not determined the Florida employees' desire for union representation. In
effect, the court held that the Board's desire to remedy the New York unfair labor practices
could not infringe on the Florida employees' freedom of choice.
90 "There is, after all, nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects
of the employer's acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they
can do so by filing a representation petition." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613
(1969).
91 See Irving, Remedies Under the NVLRA: An Update, 32 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 73, 81 (1979).
92 See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
93 For example, a well-informed employer, determined to avoid union representation,
will realize that preventing union support from developing into majority support will pre-
clude the NLRB's use of a card-majority bargaining order. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) ("If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's strength
and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election, he may see no need to
violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity. The damage will have been
done. . ..
94 See Thompson & Pollitt, Oversight Hearings of the NLBR: A Preliminag Report, 27 LAB.
LJ. 539, 540-42 (1976) (identifying the "rogue employers"). The authors identify J.P. Ste-
vens Co., Florida Steel Corp., Monroe Auto Equipment Co., Dow Chemical Co., and Litton
Industries as the "rogue employers" of the NLRB. Id at 540-41. These employers have com-
mitted numerous unfair labor practices, and have come before the NLRB many times. For
example, as of 1976, J.P. Stevens Co. had been before the NLRB 15 separate times; each time
the Board concluded that the company had violated the Act. Id at 540. In addition, as of
1976, the circuit courts of appeals had sustained the NLRB on eight different occasions, and
heard contempt citations against J.P. Stevens Co. on five occasions. Id at 540-41.
95 Bok,supra note 20, at 138 n.274. Professor Bok also stated: "IT]hose who would resist
this remedy in the name of the employees must answer for the employees whose free choice is
currently impaired by the lack of adequate remedies." Id at 135.
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b. Arguments Against Nonmajority Bargaining Orders. Opponents of
nonmajority bargaining orders argue that the NLRB lacks the authority
to issue such orders. First, they contend that NLRB remedial actions
under section 10(c) cannot compromise the principle of majority rule.96
Second, these opponents claim that the NLRB must respect employee
free choice at all times; nonmajority bargaining orders eliminate that
choice, and replace it with an administrative determination of what is
best for the employees. 97 Indeed, through a nonmajority bargaining or-
der, the NLRB may designate a union as the exclusive representative of
employees who may not desire any union representation. 98
As discussed above, proponents of such orders attempt to reconcile
employee free choice and majority rule with nonmajority bargaining or-
ders by arguing that serious employer unfair labor practices prevent ma-
jority support from ever developing in the first place.99 Accordingly, a
bargaining order merely places the parties in the position that they
would have been in but for the unfair labor practices.10 0 This argument
96 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1042 (1979) (Penello, dis-
senting); Platt, The Supreme Court Looks At Bargaining Orders Based on Authorization Cards, 4 GA.
L. REv. 779, 796 (1970).
97 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1043 (1979) (Penello,
dissenting).
98 Employee free choice and majority rule are fundamental principles of the National
Labor Relations Act. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. The NLRB should not
compromise majority rule or employee free choice without legislative or judicial support. Op-
ponents of nonmajority bargaining orders argue that nothing in the legislative history of the
National Labor Relations Act supports the argument that the NLRB can balance employee
free choice and majority rule against the Board's § 10(c) remedial powers. See United Dairy
Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1040 (1979) (Penello, dissenting). Seegenerally Wey-
and, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 556 (1945).
Further, although proponents rely on Supreme Court dictum in Gissel to support the
propriety of nonmajority bargaining orders, such reliance is weak. The Supreme Court never
expressly said that nonmajority bargaining orders could issue when "outrageous" and "perva-
sive" unfair labor practices existed. Rather, before discussing the card-majority bargaining
orders involved in Gissel, the Court mentioned that the Fourth Circuit had "left open the
possibility of imposing a bargaining order' without need of inquiry into majority status on the
basis of cards or otherwise, in 'exceptional' cases marked by 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' un-
fair labor practices." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 613. The Supreme Court,
however, did not adopt the Fourth Circuit's statement; it said only that "the actual area of
disagreement between our position here and that of the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practi-
cal matter." Id at 613. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's position emerged from dictum in an
earlier case. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1967); see
Platt, supra note 96, at 796-97. Finally, the dictum in S.S. Logan Packing Co. relied on a schol-
arly hypothetical posed by Professor Bok. SS Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d at 570 n.35; see
Bok, supra note 20, at 132-39. Dictum built upon dictum, which in turn was built upon a
scholarly hypothetical, hardly supports Board authority to issue nonmajority bargaining or-
ders. See Golub, The Propriety of Issuing Gissel Bargaining Orders Where the Union Has Never At-
taineda Majoriy, 29 LAB. L.J. 631, 636 (1978).
99 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
too See United Dairy Farme~s Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1038 (1979) (Fanning &
Jenkins, dissenting) ("Where the union has, despite the employer's egregious misconduct,
nonetheless achieved substantial support [albeit not majority support], the issuance of a bar-
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fails to recognize, however, that unions lose over fifty percent of all elec-
tions untainted by employer unfair labor practices. 0 1 Thus the under-
lying presumption of the proponents' argument-that unfair labor
practices cause the apparent lack of employee support-is statistically
invalid. In many cases, nonmajority bargaining orders will actually un-
dermine employee free choice and majority rule. 10 2 In contrast, refusal
to issue bargaining orders when there is no prior evidence of majority
support undermines no principles. A refusal is not the equivalent of a
finding that a majority of employees did not and do not support the
union. 0 3 Instead, failure to grant a nonmajority bargaining order only
indicates that, based on the factual record, the NLRB cannot ascertain
what employees would have chosen but for the unfair labor practices.
Finally, extraordinary remedies other than nonmajority bargaining
orders are available to effectively curb employer unfair labor practices
that restrict employee free choice.10 4 Examples of alternative remedies
are union access to employer facilities, 10 5 Board-ordered speeches by
high-ranking company management, 106 and resort to district court in-
junctive relief.'0 7 These remedies do not create a forced collective bar-
gaining order is appropriate since there is a very good probability that had employee choice
been allowed to emerge it would have favored the union.").
101 In the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1979, for example, unions won 3,623 out of 8,043
elections, or 45% of those conducted by the NLRB. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 16 (1979) reprinted in
LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 278 (BNA 1980).
102 Indeed, as Member Penello stated in dissent in UnitedDaiy I: "Majority rule, with all
its imperfections, is the best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guaranty of
political liberty that mankind has yet discovered." 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1043 (1979) (quoting
statement of Sen. Wagner, 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935)).
103 As the plurality opinion in United Daiy I stated:
[The dissenters] state that our view is equivalent to a determination that
here a majority of the employees oppose the Union. That is simply not the
case. There is no way of knowing how a majority of the employees feel about
the Union. The most that can be said is that at no time has a majority of the
employees indicated that they supported the Union.
242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1028 n.10 (1979).
104 In United Dai
, 
I, for example, the plurality opinion developed several extraordinary
remedies, stating: "Respondent's unfair labor practices are, in the circumstances of this case,
so 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' that these conventional remedies will not suffice to dissipate
them and are inadequate to give Respondent's employees sufficiently explicit reassurances
and understanding of their rights under the Act." 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1029 (1979); see supra
note 71 for a listing of the extraordinary remedies in United Daily.
1o5 See Haddon House Food Prods., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979), enforced as modifedsub nom.
Local 115, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 401-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 141 (1981).
106 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1031 (1979), enforced and
remanded, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
107 Section 10() of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the NLRB General
Counsel to petition a district court for temporary injunctive relief in the case of an unfair
labor practice charge. 29 U.S.C. § 1606) (1976). Although the Board rarely uses this alterna-
tive form of remedy, injunctive relief could be an effective deterrent against employer miscon-
duct during the six-month period necessary to conclude an unfair labor practice charge. See
Pettibone, The See. 100) Bargaining Order in Gissel- Type Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 648 (1976); Note,
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gaining relationship, yet they operate to raise the prestige of the union,
to help foster an uncoercive atmosphere, and to deter employers from
committing unfair labor practices.108
III
A PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
REPRESENTATIVE BARGAINING ORDERS
An analytical model for the issuance of both nonmajority and card-
majority bargaining orders is necessary to provide guidelines and allevi-
ate problems in this area. For example, requiring the NLRB to make a
detailed factual analysis would reduce inconsistencies in both the imple-
mentation and the enforcement of bargaining-order remedies.'0 9 Fur-
Compelling Collective Bargaining Under § 100) of the National Labor Relations Act, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 187 (1979).
108 In Haddon Food House Prods., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979), enforcedas modifedsub nom.
Local 115, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 141 (1981), the Board, although not issuing a nonmajority bargaining order, or-
dered the employer to: grant the union access to company bulletin boards and other posting
places for a two-year period; make available to the union a list of the names and addresses of
its current employees; give union spokesmen reasonable access to nonwork areas during non-
work periods; grant the union equal time if the employer convened its employees for a "cap-
tive audience" speech; allow the union to make one 30-minute preelection speech before any
Board-scheduled election; post copies of the Board's notice at the employer's premises; mail
copies of the notice to employees and former employees at their homes; reprint the notice in
appropriate company publications; reprint the notice in newspapers of general circulation in
the vicinity; and order the company president personally to read a copy of the notice to an
assembly of employees. 640 F.2d at 400-01. Recognizing the strength of these remedies, the
court stated:
The access remedies are designed to assist the Union in communicating
with the employees, and to assist the employees in hearing the Union's side of
the story without fear of retaliation. The notice remedies are intended to in-
form the employees of their statutory rights and the legal limits on the Em-
ployer's conduct, and to reassure them that further violations will not occur.
Id at 399-400.
Many of these remedies have come under severe criticism and suffer from problems simi-
lar to those that afflict representative bargaining orders. See, e.g., Local 115, International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir.) (denying enforcement of Board
order requiring company president to read notice to employees: "Such specificity is uniquely
oppressive on the individual singled out, and the lack of particularized need may create the
misimpression that the Board is seeking to punish an uncooperative respondent."), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 141 (1981); Textile Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896, 903-04 (2d Cir.
1967) (finding requirement that company officials read Board notice of unfair labor practices
to their employees to be humiliating), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968). Most extraordinary
remedies have come out of the litigation involving J.P. Stevens, Inc., referred to by the Sec-
ond Circuit as "'the most notorious recidivist' in the field of labor law'." NLRB v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Bartosic & Lanoff, Escalating the Stmggle
Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 256 n.4 (1972)), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978). Application of these remedies to other employers, therefore, has sparked contro-
versy, for not many other employers have as poor a record for anti-union misconduct as J.P.
Stevens. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1038 n.54 (1979)
(Penello, dissenting); Bartosic & Lanoff, supra, at 256 n.4; Thompson & Pollitt, sura note 94.
109 See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
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thermore, NLRB use of an analytical model would restore the Board's
factfinding function and, concomitantly, relieve the courts of appeals
from having to make findings of fact.'"'
One basic model for both nonmajority and card-majority bargain-
ing orders, as opposed to separate models for each, highlights the proper
role of each order in the Board's remedial scheme.I1 ' To reflect the fun-
damental differences between the two 6rders, the proposed model con-
tains variations for nonmajority bargaining orders. The logical starting
point for developing the analytical model is NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co," 2 2
thus, the Supreme Court's four factors form the outline for the proposed
model." 31
A. Extensiveness of Employer's Unfair Labor Practices
In determining the propriety of a bargaining order in a particular
case, the NLRB should consider the "quality, severity, reach, repetition,
and variety of the unfair labor practices."' 4 Not every unfair labor
practice should support a bargaining order. Indeed, the Court in Gissel
recognized a category of "minor or less extensive unfair labor practices,
which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will
not sustain a bargaining order."'"15 A proper balance between majority
rule, employee free choice, and remedial policy would preclude isolated
and ineffectual unfair labor practices from supporting bargaining
orders. 116
1 10 See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
111 The fundamental difference between the two bargaining orders lies in their factual
context. In nonmajority bargaining order cases, the union has failed to achieve majority
support. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. In card-majority bargaining order cases,
the union at one time allegedly enjoyed majority support, but nonetheless either lost the
secret ballot election, or lost its card majority. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
Prior to an election, the union may file unfair labor practice charges and "block" the
election. 29 C.F.R. § 102.71(b) (1981). If the Board finds that the misconduct precludes
holding a free election, a bargaining order may issue. See Coating Prods. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1981) (NLRB's issuance of bargaining order on basis of union authorization
cards signed by majority of employees not abuse of discretion); NLRB v. Suburban Ford,
Inc., 646 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1981) (six out of nine employees signed cards). When the union
at one time enjoyed majority support but no election occurs, therefore, the union alleges that
the employer unfair labor practices precluded the possibility of holding a free and uncoerced
election. See id at 1245-46 ("The NLRB found .. .the Company engaged in unfair labor
practices that would tend to undermine the Unions' majority strength and impede the elec-
tion processes."). In nonmajority bargaining order cases, therefore, the union alleges that the
employer's unfair labor practices prevented the development of majority support.
112 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
113 See supra text accompanying note 47.
114 United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n (United Daipy II1), 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 (1981).
115 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 615; see supra text accompanying note 37.
116 Two recent cases in the First Circuit illustrate that court's reluctance to enforce bar-
gaining orders involving less serious unfair labor practices. In NLRB v. Amber Delivery
Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1981), the court refused to enforce the Board's bargaining
order, stating: "In these circumstances, we think the holding of a fair election-which consti-
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To promote consistency in the application of bargaining orders, the
NLRB should delineate certain types of unfair labor practices that
.would create a rebuttable presumption that a bargaining order was
proper.' 1 7 By relying on research studies or testimony from experienced
parties, the Board should identify those unfair labor practices that
clearly affect employee free choice." 8 Unfair labor practices signifi-
cantly affecting a large percentage of employees, engaged in by high
management officials, and constituting complete action, rather than
threats, should trigger the rebuttable presumption of a bargaining or-
tutes the 'preferred' method of determining a bargaining unit's representative. . . remains a
viable option." Id at 71 (citation omitted). The court found that the acts of employee inter-
rogation and solicitation, although unfair labor practices, had "minimal impact on the elec-
tion process." Id at 70. Further, the one-day suspensions of union adherents and the changes
in working conditions, although occurring at the height of the union campaign, did not jus-
tify the "extreme" remedy of a bargaining order. Id at 70-7 1.
Earlier, in NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1978), the same court also
refused to enforce a bargaining order. The court found that the cancellation of a scheduled
wage increase, solicitation of grievances and promising to remedy them, threatened reprisals,
and discharge of an employee, although all unfair labor practices, did not render a fair elec-
tion infeasible. Id at 120. Emphasizing that the management employee who committed the
unfair labor practices no longer worked for the company, the court found that the "unfair
labor practices [fell] within the third Gissel category." Id; see also supra note 37 (further exam-
ples of "less serious" unfair labor practice cases).
117 The presumption would operate in the following manner. The General Counsel
,would continue to have the burden of establishing the commission of unfair labor practices.
- If that burden is met, and the unfair labor practices fall within the class of misconduct that
triggers the presumption, the General Counsel would not have the burden of proving causa-
tion between the misconduct and the loss of majority support. Instead, because of the inher-
ent adverse effect of such practices on employee free choice, the Board may presume
causation. The presumption is rebuttable, however, and the employer would have an oppor-
tunity to show that an untainted election is possible despite the unfair labor practices. The
employer might do this by demonstrating any of the following: an extended passage of time
between the unfair labor practices and final adjudication; termination of management em-
ployees who committed misconduct; serious union misconduct; large employee turnover or
reduction in workforce; and affirmative acts of the employer designed to remedy past viola-
tions and create a spirit of cooperation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Arrow Molded Plastics, Inc., 653
F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 1981) (four-year passage of time since first election militates in favor of
a rerun election and against a bargaining order); NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110,
120 (Ist Cir. 1978) (termination of management employee who committed unfair labor prac-
tices reduced likelihood that past practices would affect future employee choice); Peerless of
Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1973) (apology of company president to
employees and concluding bargaining order not warranted); Laura Modes Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
1592, 1595-96 (1963) (refusal to issue bargaining order because of union violence).
118 For example, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 611
n.31 (1969), relied on a study by Professor Pollitt concerning the relative effects of unfair
labor practices on rerun elections. See generalky Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41
N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). A controversial study by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Her-
man in 1976 analyzed the effects of employer misconduct on employee choice in representa-
tion questions. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTION: LAW AND REALITY (1976). For an interesting example of the Board's use of em-
pirical studies in the creation of Board election rules, see General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
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der.t 19 Examples include those practices that ,directly affect employee
job security, such as mass discriminatory firings, plant closings, or sub-
contracting of work.120 Nonmajority bargaining orders should only is-
sue in cases marked by these "outrageous and pervasive" unfair labor
practices.' 2 1 Although both card-majority and nonmajority bargaining
orders affect employee free choice and majority rule, nonmajority bar-
gaining orders have a greater potential adverse effect on the employees'
true desires.122 When only less serious'unfair labor practices are present,
nonmajority bargaining orders should never issue. Instead, less serious
unfair labor practices 123 should not support a bargaining order unless
the union shows prior majority support. 124 By restricting the use of
nonmajority bargaining orders to a limited and identifiable class of seri-
ous unfair labor practices, the Board will avoid expanding such orders
beyond those "exceptional" cases targeted by the Supreme Court in
Gissel 125
119 See Salem, Non-Majority Bargaining Orders: A Prospective View in Light of United Dairy
Farmers, 32 LAB. L.J. 145, 156-57 (1981).
120 Categorizing unfair labor practices is not a new idea. In Gissel, for example, the
Court mentioned three categories of unfair labor practices: "'outrageous' and 'pervasive' ";
"less pervasive"; and "less extensive." 395 U.S. at 613-15. Similarly, both the Board and the
courts have recognized "hallmark" violations of federal labor law. Coating Prod. v. NLRB,
648 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 212-13 (2d
Cir. 1980). These "hallmark" violations include: closing of plants; grants of benefits; reas-
signment, demotion, or discharge of union adherents; and threats of plant closure or job ter-
mination. Id at 212-13. Only misconduct involving complete action should trigger the
presumption of a bargaining order. Threats and interrogation of employees do not have as
adverse an effect on employee attitudes as does complete action (e.g., termination or plant
closure). See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 118, at 149-52. On the
other hand, discriminatory discharges are the "ultimate weapon in thwarting the employees'
exercise of protected statutory rights," Ludwig Fish & Produce, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1087
(1975), and plant closure is "the penultimate threat for an employee." Electrical Prods. Div.
of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 987 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
121 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-15 (1969).
122 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
123 Although they do not rise to complete action threatening job security, these unfair
labor practices are still serious. As the NLRB noted in General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B.
1109, 1109-10, enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted):
A direct threat of loss of employment, whether through plant closure,
discharge, or layoff, is one of the most flagrant means by which an employer
can hope to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative.
Such conduct is especially repugnant to the purposes of the Act because no
legitimate justification can exist for threatening to close a plant or to impose
more onerous and severe working conditions in the event of a union victory.
Such threats can only have one purpose, to deprive employees of their right
freely to select or reject a bargaining representative!
124 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15 (1969); supra note 42 and ac-
companying text.
125 Id at 613. In addition to restricting nonmajority bargaining orders to cases involving
serious unfair labor practices, this proposal would simplify the whole area of bargaining or-
ders by delineating the proper use of both nonmajority and card-majority bargaining orders.
Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, in their study on union representation elections,
concluded that bargaining orders, if retained by the Board, should only issue based upon
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Although card-majority bargaining orders may issue in cases in-
volving less serious unfair labor practices, mere recital of the unfair la-
bor practices is insufficient.1 26 Instead, the Board should factually
analyze how the misconduct precludes a fair election, taking into ac-
count the reach, repetition, and variety of the employer misconduct.
Other relevant criteria are the size of the employee unit affected, the
speed of the employer's unlawful response, the nature of the company's
business, the size of the surrounding community, and any affirmative
acts by the employer indicating a spirit of cooperation. 2 7
predetermined criteria, not upon case-by-case judgments concerning impact. J. GErMAN, S.
GOLDBERG &J. HERMAN, supra note 118, at 155. The authors found that their data indicated
that the Board was incapable of makingjudgments concerning the effect of unfair labor prac-
tices on free choice. Id Whether or not all of the authors' recommendations are accepted,
their point is well taken. In order to encourage consistency in Board decisions and to stress
the bargaining order's real purpose as a remedy for unfair labor practices, and not as a
method of representative selection, the Board should predetermine, by categorizing unfair
labor practices, the proper use of bargaining orders.
126 See NLRB v. Ely's Foods Inc., 656 F.2d 290, 294 (8th Cir. 1981) (McManus, CJ.,
concurring):
I am aware of and approve the legal standard of review that requires us
to give deference to the Board on these matters. But I suggest that such defer-
ence is not warranted where the Board has merely set forth a litany, reciting
conclusions by rote without any factual explication.
127 Each of these considerations might affect the impact of the unfair labor practices on
the election process. Apologetic remarks by management, for example, may eliminate any
lasting effect of the employer's misconduct. See, e.g., Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d
1108, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973). Conversely, the smaller the employee unit or town in which the
company is located, the more pervasive will be the unfair labor practices' effect. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Ely's Foods Inc., 656 F.2d 290, 293 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Of equal importance is the fact
that the store in issue here was family-run, located in a small town."); NLRB v. Circo Resorts,
Inc., 646 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In addition, since a small bargaining unit is involved,
the need for a bargaining order is greater.'); Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 703
(9th Cir. 1981) ("The probable impact of unfair labor practices is increased when a small
bargaining unit, such as here, is involved and increases the need for a bargaining order.")
(quoting NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1980)).
The NLRB also recognizes that the timing of the unfair labor practices is relevant.
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 n.13 (1981) ("The Board has often
found that the speed of an employer's response to union activity is a factor to be weighed in
determining the necessity of a bargaining order."). Further, if large employee turnover or
workforce reduction occurs, a bargaining 6rder may not be appropriate because a majority of
the coerced employees may no longer work for the employer. See, e.g., Peerless of Am., Inc. v.
NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973):
Finally, we take note of the substantial reduction of the plant's work
force. While there was no substantial employee turnover, nevertheless a
marked decrease in the number of bargaining unit employees deserves some
consideration, not only because the division of sentiment among the remain-
ing employees may be different, but also because employees may view the
benefits of unionization in a far different light when the economic plight of
their employer has substantially diminished their ranks.
See generally Note, '"4)er Al, Tomorrow Is Another Day'" Should Subsequent Events Affect the Valid-
it, ofBargaining Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 505 (1979). Additionally, the Board should consider
the nature of the employer's business:
The nature of the Company's business and its location should also be
considered. A self-service shoe store lends itself to the employment of rela-
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B. Likelihood of Recurrence of Unfair Labor Practices
To ensure that bargaining orders remain "exceptional," the Board
should not routinely issue them whenever serious violations occur.1 28 In-
stead, the Board should determine whether a bargaining order, as op-
posed to traditional remedies, is necessary to prevent continued
misconduct. The NLRB should base its determination in part on the
employer's past history of wrongdoing. Traditional remedies, such as
cease and desist orders, do not affect employers with histories of recidi-
vism.1 29 For these employers, bargaining orders may be the only effec-
tive deterrent.1 30
On the other hand, in cases involving first-time violators, the
NLRB cannot accurately predict that traditional remedies alone will
fail to deter future misconduct. Therefore, the Board should apply to
these employers a strong presumption against the issuance of bargaining
orders. Nevertheless, statements of continued union animus, or miscon-
duct subsequent to the unfair labor practices but prior to the Board
order, may indicate a probability of future misconduct and thus rebut
the presumption. 1 3  As a general r'ule, however, bargaining orders
tively youthful, unsophisticated or superannuated, unskilled employees--both
of whom are more likely to be susceptible to extraneous influence in making
their decision about Union activity than more sophisticated and skilled
employees.
NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971).
Finally, employer misconduct occurring subsequent to the alleged unfair labor practices,
but prior to the Board's order, is relevant; it demonstrates that the employer is still committed
to opposing unionization through unlawful means. See Chromalloy Mining & Minerals
Alaska Div. Chromally Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1131 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980).
128 See NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 (Ist Cir. 1978) (despite serious
unfair labor practices, bargaining order unenforceable, because no evidence indicated that
employer would continue unfair labor practices or ignore Board's cease and desist order).
129 Traditional remedies for unfair labor practices include: cease and desist orders; rein-
statement of unlawfully discharged employees; make-whole relief to employees for losses occa-
sioned by employer's unlawful conduct; and publication of Board notice announcing findings
of unfair labor practices. See, e.g., United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026,
1030-31 (1979). Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 612 (1969): "If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's strength and
destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election, he may see no need to vio-
late a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity." This is especially true for recidi-
vist violators.
130 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted), in which the Board noted: "Respondent's history of recidivism reveals its continuing
antipathy to its employees' statutory rights, and suggests as well the futility of proceeding to a
second election, since there is every reason to believe that Respondent would again flout the
Act in order to avoid a union victory."
131 See Chromalloy Mining & Minerals, Alaska Div. Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. NLRB,
620 F.2d 1120, 1131 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (subsequent misconduct demonstrates continued com-
mitment to opposing unionization through unlawful means). On the other hand, different
considerations may indicate that the presumption is warranted. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pilgrim
Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 (1st Cir. 1978) (termination of management employee who
committed unfair labor practices reduced likelihood that past misconduct would continue).
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should issue only in cases involving recidivist violators of the National
Labor Relations Act. 132
C. The Possibiliy of Erasing Edficts of Past Practices and Ensuring a Fair
Election Through Use of Traditional or Extraordinay Remedies
Unlike bargaining orders, traditional remedies have little adverse
effect on employee free choice and majority rule. 3 3 The Board, there-
fore, should inquire first into the effectiveness of traditional remedies
before considering the propriety of a bargaining order. If traditional
remedies can deter future employer misconduct and foster an atmos-
phere conducive to free choice, then bargaining orders should not is-
sue.' 34 This requirement would not only reinforce the "exceptional"
status of the bargaining order, but would also preserve the secret ballot
election as the preferred method of representative selection.
Similarly, the Board should consider the effectiveness of other ex-
traordinary remedies as an alternative to the bargaining order. 3 5 These
132 The NLRB apparently disagrees with this proposal. The Board, although considering
the employer's recidivism in United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 n. 11
(1981), stated:
Although recidivism is an important element to be weighed, we do not
consider it to be a prerequisite to the issuance of a bargaining order. Such a
requirement would encourage an employer innocent of prior misconduct to
launch an unlawful campaign against union activity, since the employer
would be aware that a bargaining order was unavailable to remedy its
misconduct.
Further, in Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1161, 1165 n.16
(1982), the Board issued a nonmajority bargaining order, even though the Board itself recog-
nized that "[i]n the instant case, there is no evidence that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices predating those described above."
The Board's view ignores the Supreme Court's statement that "a bargaining order is
designed as much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct." NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (footnote omitted); see supra note 33 and
accompanying text. A history of misconduct supports the proposition that future misconduct
is probable and that a bargaining order is necessary to deter it. An isolated violation of the
Act, however, does not indicate that future misconduct is probable. Indeed, the Board is
incapable of knowing if the first-time violator will ignore other traditional or extraordinary
remedies. Thus, the Board's statement in United Daiy III comes close to an unwarranted
assumption that all violators of the National Labor Relations Act will continue to violate the
Act with impunity unless bargaining orders issue.
133 Because none of the traditional remedies, see supra note 129, create a bargaining rela-
tionship, employee rights to choose freely a representative remain protected.
134 An of informal employee poll is one means of determining the potential effectiveness
of traditional remedies. Under § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board could
modify the election procedures to provide mechanisms for such polls. Alternatively, the
Board could issue traditional remedies for a trial period of six months to one year. After
expiration of the time period, an NLRB agent could review the situation to determine the
necessity of a bargaining order. If the traditional remedies had failed to eradicate the effects
of the past practices, the NLRB then could issue a bargaining order.
135 The NLRB has noted the "unique effectiveness of speeches [by unions] addressed to
employees assembled during working hours at the locus of their employment." H.W. Elson
Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714, 716 n.7 (1965), enforced as modfted, 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir.
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remedies, although having problems of their own, may better protect
employee free choice and majority rule. 136 The Board should analyze
both the deterrent and corrective effect of extraordinary remedies in
each case as a precondition to consideration of bargaining orders:
D. Protection of Employee Sentiment
When creating remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board
should always strive to ensure employee free choice. In some bargain-
ing-order cases, the employer's unfair labor practices may have re-
stricted that free choice. 13 7 In other cases, however, the employees may
in fact not favor unionization. 138  This possibility is even greater in
nonmajority bargaining order cases, in which the union has made no
prior showing of majority support. 139
The Board, therefore, should determine employee sentiment as ac-
curately as possible. For example, if there were a representation elec-
tion, the closeness of the vote might indicate that the union would have
won but for the unfair labor practices.i40 Similarly, even if more than
fifty percent of the employees did not sign authorization cards, the ac-
1967). Because a union speech clearly has less effect on employee free choice and majority
rule than bargaining orders, the Board should consider this type of extraordinary remedy, as
well as others, before issuing bargaining orders. See also Golub, supra note 98, at 641.
136 For a discussion of extraordinary remedies, see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying
text.
137 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
139 Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, in their study on union representation
elections, stated three relevant findings. First, they found that employees generally have
strong predispositions for or against union representation. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J.
HERMAN, supra note 118, at 146. Second, anti-union and pro-union election campaigns do
not cause most employees to switch their predispositions. Id Third, the signing of an author-
ization card is an accurate indicator of an employee's choice at the time the card is signed. Id
at 132. These findings support the thesis that when a union has actively solicited employee
signatures, and does not possess a majority of the employees' signatures on authorization
cards, a nonmajority bargaining order probably will not effectuate employee free choice. But
see Golub, supra note 98, at 640 ("[T]here is good reason to believe that the net effect [of
nonmajority bargaining orders] would be to promote, rather than to impede, the legitimate
interests of the employees as a whole.").
140 See NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2211, 2219 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Garth, J., concurring) (When determining propriety of bargaining order, Board should con-
sider "closeness of vote" when union lost election 65-64); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n
(UnitedDaiy II1), 257 N.L.R.B. 772, 775 (1981). In UnitedDaiy III, the Board noted that the
union had lost by only two votes, and stated that "the risk of imposing a minority union on
the employees is greatly decreased in view of the substantial support exhibited by the Union
in the election." Id The Board, however, went on to note that:
Although we find that the closeness of the election is a factor to be con-
sidered in this case, we would not require a close election as a condition of a
bargaining order. Such a requirement might encourage an employer to esca-
late its misconduct in order to achieve an overwhelming election victory and
avoid a bargaining order, thereby rewarding those who engage in the greatest
misconduct.
107 L.R.R.M. at 1580 n.22.
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tual percentage of those who did sign may reflect the level of employee
support.14 1 Such a factual investigation of employee support should re-
duce the number of cases in which bargaining orders infringe on em-
ployee free choice by imposing union representation when the
employees desire none.
Other safeguards exist to minimize a bargaining order's potentially
adverse impact on employee free choice and majority rule. Restricting a
bargaining order to one year permits employees to file a decertification
petition at the end of that year if the union does not represent their
interests. 142 Similarly, forbidding union security clauses in any contract
negotiated by the employer and union during the one-year period insu-
lates employees from being forced to choose between joining the union
or losing theirjobs. t4 3 Finally, requiring the union to inform all employ-
ees of their right to petition for a decertification election at the end of
the one-year period ensures employee awareness of the right to choose
freely a representative. 44
CONCLUSION
The time has come to reexamine the proper role of the bargaining
order in the Board's arsenal of remedies. The thirteen years since Gissel
have revealed strong sentiment both for and against nonmajority bar-
gaining orders, as well as major problems with the application of card-
majority bargaining orders. The acceptance or nonacceptance of
nonmajority bargaining orders will depend on the balance struck be-
tween the remedial policies of section 10(c) and the principles of major-
ity rule and employee free choice. Practical necessity should tip that
balance in favor of nonmajority bargaining orders; the NLRB must not
141 See, e.g., Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. No. 178, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1161, 1167 (1982)
(46% of employees signed union authorization cards); Haddon House Food Prods., 242
N.L.R.B. 1057, 1064-65 (1979), enforced as modifed, Local 115, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837 (1981) (21 of 60
employees signed authorization cards).
142 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1981) sets out the procedure for decertification of bargaining rep-
resentatives. In order to trigger an election, the petition needs signatures from only 30% of
the employees in the bargaining unit. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1981).
143 Union security provisions are contractual clauses found in collective bargaining
agreements. See general'y R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 639-76. These are advantageous to
unions because they increase the dues-paying membership. Id at 641. A "union shop" agree-
ment is one type of union security arrangement. It requires employees to join the union after
a grace period on the job, and to remain members during the term of the collective bargain-
ing agreements. By prohibiting union shop and other union security clauses from collective
bargaining agreements negotiated during the bargaining order period, the NLRB can ensure
that employees will have an effective choice of whether or not to join the union. See Bok,
supra note 20, at 135.
144 See NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354,367 (7th Cir.),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971)
(modifying the Board's order "to include provision for a notice to the employees advising
them of their independent right to petition for a new election"); Golub, supra note 98, at 641.
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be powerless against employers committed to fighting unionization
through unlawful means.
If bargaining orders are to be effective, however, clear and consis-
tent standards for their issuance must exist. Moreover, those standards
must be based on factual findings. Mere presumptuous standards result
in a mechanical application of bargaining orders without the essential
inquiry into their necessity in individual cases. The NLRB is a fact-
finding body designed in part to remedy individual violations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. The Board should maintain this function,
and condition any remedy not on general presumptions, but on findings
of fact.
Steven R. Wall
